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FRAMING LEGISLATION BANNING THE “GAY AND
TRANS PANIC” DEFENSES
Jordan Blair Woods *
0F

INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, criminal defendants who have attacked (and in
most cases killed) lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
(“LGBTQ”) victims have relied on the “gay and trans panic” defenses in order to avoid conviction or to receive lesser punishment. 1
Contrary to what the name suggests, the gay and trans panic defenses are not freestanding legal defenses. 2 Rather, over time, defendants have invoked gay and trans panic concepts to support one
1F

2F

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville. The
Author is thankful for the helpful discussions and suggestions from Beth Colgan, Erin Collins, Laurent Sacharoff, and Beth Zilberman. The Author is also grateful for the excellent
research assistance from Hannah Hines and the University of Arkansas School of Law library staff, and especially Cathy Chick and Steven Probst. Thank you to the editors and
staff at the University of Richmond Law Review for their careful edits, insightful suggestions, and work.
1. For simplicity, this Article often uses the phrase “gay and trans panic,” even though
different terms (for instance, “acute homosexual panic” or “homosexual panic”) have been
used to describe the concept over time. As discussed in infra Part III, scholars date the first
explicit mention of the gay and trans panic defenses in a published court decision to the
1967 California case of People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). See
Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 491 & n.81, 494‒95 (2008).
Cases in which the gay and trans panic defenses are raised typically involve a defendant
who kills an LGBTQ victim. Id. at 475.
2. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1279 (2011) (stating that
“the ‘gay panic’ defense is not an independently recognized defense”); Lee, supra note 1, at
490.
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of three well-established legal defenses: 3 (1) provocation, 4 (2) insanity 5 (or diminished capacity,6) and (3) self-defense 7 (or imperfect self-defense). 8 Depending on which of these defenses gay and
trans panic concepts are being used to support, if successfully
raised, a defendant who attacked or killed a LGBTQ victim could
receive a lesser charge or sentence, or avoid conviction and punishment altogether. 9
3F

5F

6F

4F

7F

8F

9F

This Article, prepared for the University of Richmond Law Review symposium commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the

3. Lee, supra note 1, at 475. Since first recorded in 1967, cases in over half of the states
have been documented in which defendants have used gay and trans panic ideas to support
one of these three freestanding defenses. JORDAN BLAIR WOODS, BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY
MALLORY, MODEL LEGISLATION FOR ELIMINATING THE GAY AND TRANS PANIC DEFENSES 2
(2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016-Model-GayTransP
anic-Ban-Laws-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5WT-WL2Y].
4. Although specific formulations of the provocation defense differ across jurisdictions,
the general idea is that the defendant intentionally killed another person “pursuant to provocation sufficient to cause both the defendant and a hypothetical reasonable person to act
in the heat of passion.” Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing
the Factors on Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 302 (1988). In
jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code, manslaughter is the proper charge for heat
of passion killings when “committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.3(1)(b) (1985). For an in-depth discussion of feminist critiques of the provocation defense
see generally Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2015).
5. One common formulation of the insanity defense focuses on whether defendants, by
virtue of their mental illness, lacked the capacity to understand the nature or wrongfulness
of their acts at the time of the offense. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 341 (1996). Another common
formulation of the insanity defense focuses on whether defendants, by virtue of their mental
illness, lacked the ability to control their behavior at the time of the offense. Id.
6. Unlike insanity, diminished capacity is a partial defense recognized in some jurisdictions which permits “the fact-finder to consider a sane defendant’s mental abnormality
when it assesses his degree of criminal liability.” See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 827, 828 (1977).
7. Under the traditional approach to self-defense, a non-aggressor is justified in using
“a reasonable amount of force against another person if she honestly and reasonably believes that: (1) she is in imminent or immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from her
adversary, and (2) the use of such force is necessary to avoid such danger.” Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Narrative Conception of Reasonableness, 81
MINN. L. REV. 367, 377 (1996). Jurisdictions differ on whether the definition of reasonableness for self-defense is based on an objective, subjective, or a hybrid objective-subjective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 381.
8. Unlike self-defense, imperfect self-defense is a partial defense recognized in some
jurisdictions “under which a defendant who makes an honest, but unreasonable, mistake
about the need for deadly force has a defense to murder but not to manslaughter.” Addie C.
Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1660–61 (2019).
9. WOODS, SEARS & MALLORY, supra note 3, at 2.
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Stonewall Riots of 1969, uses the Stonewall Riots as an opportunity to analyze and theorize the political dimensions of legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses. 10 As a moment of
resistance to state violence against LGBTQ people, the Stonewall
Riots are a useful platform to examine the historical and current
relationship between the state 11 and the gay and trans panic defenses. 12 Drawing on original readings of medical literature, this
Article brings the historical role of the state in the growth of gay
and trans panic to the surface and discusses how gay and trans
panic ideas blur the distinction between state and private violence. 13 As explained below, prominent psychiatrists who created
and honed gay and trans panic ideas over time worked for and conducted research in state-run hospitals and prisons. 14
10F

1F

12F

13F

14F

Since 2014, nine states have enacted legislation banning the gay
and trans panic defenses, and more states are considering similar
10. This Article focuses on legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses. Judicial bans on the gay and trans panic defenses are beyond the scope of this Article.
11. This Article often uses “the state” as a general phrase to refer to government and
its branches.
12. The Stonewall Riots of 1969 were most obviously an immediate act of resistance to
police officers who raided a bar that was a place of belonging for New York City’s LGBTQ
community, especially those at the margins (for instance, LGBTQ people of color,
transgender people, and LGBTQ street kids). See DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS
THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION (2004); Terence Kissack, Freaking Fag Revolutionaries: New York’s Gay Liberation Front, 1969–1971, 62 RADICAL HIST. REV. 104, 109 (1995).
Although the Stonewall Riots are remembered as a major moment of LGBTQ resistance to
the police, it is important to recognize literature documenting earlier moments of LGBTQ
resistance to the police. See JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE
MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1970, at 49–50 (2d ed.
1998); MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL, THE DEFINITIVE STORY OF THE LGBTQ RIGHTS
UPRISING THAT CHANGED AMERICA 121 (1993); MARC STEIN, THE STONEWALL RIOTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 8 (2019); Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment of Homosexual
Women and Men in New York City 1960–1980, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159, 160 (1980)
(“In the early sixties, [police] harassment of homosexual citizens was quite common.”); David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext
of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 878 (2008) (“There is widespread awareness that the police systematically harassed gay men and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s.”).
Importantly, scholars have also discussed how judges played a key role in justifying police
surveillance and crackdowns against homosexuality based on stereotypes of gay men as sexual predators in the mid-twentieth century. See generally GARY DAVID COMSTOCK,
VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 153–56 (1991); Anna Lvovsky, Cruising in
Plain View: Surveillance and the Unique Insights of Antihomosexual Policing, J. URB. HIST.
2 (2017).
13. Scholars have criticized sodomy laws on similar grounds. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas,
Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (1992) (arguing that “the law
against homosexual sodomy has been vexed from its inception by a persistent and pervasive
practice of homophobic violence on the part of public officials and private citizens alike”).
14. See infra Part I and Section II.B.
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legislation. 15 Advocates who oppose these bans have largely centered their critiques on the view that eliminating the gay and trans
panic defenses violates the due process rights of defendants who
kill LGBTQ victims. 16 Although it is important to take due process
arguments seriously, these considerations do not fully capture the
stakes of recognizing the gay and trans panic defenses under the
substantive criminal law. 17 Because of its individualized focus, the
due process lens treats gay and trans panic cases as incidents involving private violence perpetrated by one individual against another, and in so doing, neglects the historical role of the state in
the growth of gay and trans panic as a concept and defense strategy. 18
15F

16F

17F

18F

First introduced as a medical concept in 1920 by Edward J.
Kempf—a prominent psychiatrist at federally created and federally run St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C. 19—gay and
19F

15. See Gay/Trans Panic Defense Bans, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://w
ww.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-panic-defense-bans.pdf (showing that California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island have
eliminated the gay and trans panic defenses through legislation) [https://perma.cc/RQ8SP4VN]; Alexandra Holden, The Gay/Trans Panic Defense: What It Is, and How To End It,
A.B.A. (July 10, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/member-feat
ures/gay-trans-panic-defense/ (discussing legislative efforts to ban the gay and trans panic
defense in Washington, New Mexico, Texas, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and
the District of Columbia) [https://perma.cc/JMY5-3B2M]. At the federal level, the Equality
Act, which has been introduced in Congress, also bans the gay and trans panic defense. Id.
16. See WOODS, SEARS & MALLORY, supra note 3, at 15; see also Phillip Van Slooten,
D.C. Council Holds Hearing on Hate Crime Prosecution, Panic Defense Bills, WASH. BLADE
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2019/10/24/dc-council-holds-hearing-onhate-crimes-prosecution-panic-defense-bills/ (noting that the president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers recently testified on due process grounds against a
bill before the D.C. Council that would ban the gay and trans panic defenses) [https:
//perma.cc/8U6D-29QE].
17. A more thorough discussion of due process arguments against banning the gay and
trans panic defenses will be provided in infra Part IV.
18. This historical role of the state in the growth of gay and trans panic as a medical
concept and defense strategy is discussed in infra Part I and Section II.B. Related to the
point involving the individualized focus of the due process legal framework, Elizabeth
Stanko has argued that “in using the legal framework to define criminal violence, criminologists usually embrace the tacit assumption that the law’s violence (the use of legitimate
violence by the state) is not as problematical and subject to scrutiny as the use of violence
by individuals.” Elizabeth A. Stanko, Challenging the Problem of Men’s Individual Violence,
in JUST BOYS DOING BUSINESS? MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND CRIME 32, 33 (Tim Newburn &
Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1994); see also, Rosemary Cairns Way, Incorporating Equality into
the Substantive Criminal Law: Inevitable or Impossible?, 4 J.L. & EQUALITY 203, 239 (2005)
(“The criminal law functions by narrowing its focus on particular acts, particular actors and
particular moments in time.”).
19. See infra Part I.
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trans panic ideas operated within a broader state agenda to regulate and control “sexual deviance.” This agenda enabled and legitimized state violence against LGBTQ people, including draconian
medical treatments that the state forced or pressured LGBTQ people to undergo (for instance, electric shock therapy, hydrotherapy, 20 and drug therapy). 21 This Article examines how in the 1940s
and 1950s, prominent psychiatrists who worked for and conducted
research in state-run hospitals and prisons advanced new definitions of “gay and trans panic” that more aggressively blamed
LGBTQ victims for the violence they experienced and demonized
them as sexual aggressors. 22 These new definitions fell in line with
a then-growing consensus in the United States psychiatric profession that homosexuality (which was then generally understood to
include gender nonconformity) 23 was a mental disease. 24 In the
1960s, defendants who killed LGBTQ victims started to take advantage of these stigmatizing definitions of gay and trans panic in
order to support legal defenses of insanity, self-defense, and provocation. 25 In this regard, gay and trans panic ideas not only legitimized state violence against LGBTQ people, but also excused and
justified 26 violence in ways that blurred the distinction between
state and private violence. 27
20F

21F

2F

23F

24F

25F

26F

27F

20. SARAH A. LEAVITT, ST. ELIZABETHS IN WASHINGTON, D.C.: ARCHITECTURE OF AN
ASYLUM 108–09 (2019) (“Hydrotherapy used specifically designed baths to submerge patients in either hot or cold water for several hours to either shock or calm them.”).
21. See infra Section II.B.
22. See id.
23. The idea that “gender identity” was distinct from biological sex assigned at birth
did not emerge until researchers advanced this idea in the 1950s. See Noa Ben-Asher, The
Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 51, 82 (2006).
24. See infra Section II.A.
25. See infra Part III.
26. Because gay and trans panic concepts have been used over time to support the freestanding defenses of provocation, insanity, and self-defense, it is difficult to classify these
strategies as either justifications or excuses. Lee, supra note 1, at 489.
27. See infra Part III. Instructive on this point, Mark Ungar has advanced a typology
that recognizes three categories of state violence against LGBTQ people: (1) “legal” violence,
(2) “semilegal” violence, and (3) extrajudicial violence. Mark Ungar, State Violence and
LGBTQ Rights, in VIOLENCE AND GLOBALIZATION’S PARADOX POLITICS 48, 48 (Kenton Worchester et al. eds., 2002). For “legal” violence, “[t]he courts, the prisons, and other government institutions allow discriminatory and violent practices against individuals in their
charge.” Id. For “semi-legal” violence, police agencies are armed with laws that “encourage
and allow them to carry out unaccountable” violence against LGBTQ people. Id. at 48–49.
For extrajudicial violence, LGBTQ people are a primary target of “killings, torture, hate
crimes, and harassment” by non-state actors. Id. For this third category, Ungar explains
that “[t]hough rarely sponsored by the state, such activities are often directed by off-duty
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The position of the state in the historical growth of gay and trans
panic as a concept has not been a central focus in legal scholarship. 28 Bringing this history to the surface is important because it
shows how deeply rooted forms of state violence against LGBTQ
civilians can arise from state-run institutions and evolve into continued state-condoned and state-legitimized violence. 29 This history also demonstrates why the gay and trans panic defenses do
much more damage than simply legitimize bad and discredited science. 30 Rather, allowing criminal defendants to rely on gay and
28F

29F

30F

officials and either ignored or tacitly encouraged by a government with a constitutional responsibility to do the opposite.” Id.
28. There is a robust body of legal scholarship that discusses the gay and trans panic
defenses more generally. See, e.g., Robert G. Bagnall et al., Burdens on Gay Litigants and
Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497 (1984); Gary David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual
Panic Defense, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 81 (1992); Joshua Dressler, When Heterosexual Men Kill
Homosexual Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the Reasonable
Man Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995); Lee; supra note 1; Cynthia Lee &
Peter Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, Heteronormativity, and the Murder of
Transgender Women, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 77 (2014); Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter; The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 133
(1992); J. Kelly Strader et al., Gay Panic, Gay Victims, and the Case for Gay Shield Laws,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1473 (2015); Aimee Wodda & Vanessa R. Panfil, “Don’t Talk to Me
About Deception”: The Necessary Erosion of the Trans* Panic Defense, 78 ALB. L. REV. 927
(2015); David Alan Perkiss, Comment, A New Strategy for Neutralizing the Gay Panic Defense at Trial: Lessons from the Lawrence King Case, 60 UCLA L. REV. 778 (2013).
29. Ungar, supra note 27, at 50. On this point, it is important to recognize literature
that makes parallel arguments that connect contemporary racialized violence in state institutions (i.e., mass incarceration) to historical systems of subordination that include slavery
and debt peonage. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010) (“Like Jim Crow (and slavery),
mass incarceration operates as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, and
institutions that operate collectively to ensure that the subordinate status of a group defined
largely by race.”); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 43 (2003) (discussing connections between the rise of incarceration as “the primary mode of state-inflicted punishment”
and “new conditions [that] reflected the rise of the bourgeoisie as the social class whose
interests and aspirations furthered new scientific, philosophical, cultural, and popular
ideas”); Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 844
(1997) (stressing that “but for the fruits of slavery and entrenched racism, African Americans would not find themselves disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system”); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1449 (2012)
(noting “the multiple ways that women of color were situated within a variety of overlapping
structures that singularly and jointly constituted the contours through which surveillance
and social punishment take place”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (2019) (“Prison abolitionists look back to history to trace the
roots of today's carceral state to the racial order established by slavery and look forward to
imagine a society without carceral punishment.”); see also Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2020), (manuscript at 6–11) (on file with author) (providing an overview of abolition theory).
30. Lee, supra note 1, at 484–85 (“The idea that homosexuality, latent or otherwise, is
a mental illness has long been discredited.”).
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trans panic strategies leaves space for antiquated ideas of sexual
deviance to thrive in the criminal justice system today.
In spite of the recent wave of legislative bans, the gay and trans
panic defenses are still available defense strategies in federal court
and in most state courts today. This result is worrisome given the
widespread inequalities that LGBTQ people, and especially the
most marginalized segments of the LGBTQ population (those who
are people of color, transgender or gender nonconforming, homeless, undocumented, and living with HIV), experience in the criminal justice system. 31 LGBTQ people, and especially intersectionally marginalized LGBTQ people, are disproportionately victims of
violence perpetrated by civilians, law enforcement, and correctional staff and inmates. 32 Research further shows that antiLGBTQ juror biases influence jury deliberation and outcomes in
criminal cases, 33 including cases in which defendants raise gay and
trans panic defenses. 34
31F

32F

3F

34F

In light of the state’s historical role in the growth of gay and
trans panic ideas as well as the ongoing inequalities that the gay
and trans panic defenses continue to present for LGBTQ people
today, this Article lays an early theoretical foundation for a politi-

31. See generally JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES (2011); Jordan Blair Woods, LGBT Identity and
Crime, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 667 (2017).
32. See ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS
AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12, at 18 (2013) (“Inmates who identified their sexual orientation as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or other reported high rates of inmate-on inmate
sexual victimization and staff sexual misconduct.”); SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF
THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 12–13 (Dec.
2016), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS%20Full%20Report
%20-%20FINAL%201.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/N33V-9UPC]. See generally DOUG MEYER,
VIOLENCE AGAINST QUEER PEOPLE: RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ANTILGBT DISCRIMINATION (2015); CHRISTY MALLORY ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., DISCRIMINATION
AND HARASSMENT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN THE LGBT COMMUNITY (2015),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Discrimination-and-Hara
ssment-in-Law-Enforcement-March-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8B7-FDLU].
33. See generally Jordan Blair Woods, LGBTQ in the Courtroom: How Sexuality and
Gender Identity Impact the Jury System, in CRIMINAL JURIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 61, 61–83 (Cynthia J. Najdowski & Margaret C. Stevenson eds., 2019) (providing an overview of research on the relevant challenges linked to sexuality and gender identity in criminal cases).
34. See, e.g., Sarah E. Malik & Jessica Salerno, Moral Outrage Drives Biases Against
Gay and Lesbian Individuals in Legal Judgments, JURY EXPERT, Nov. 2014, at 1, 3; Jessica
Salerno et al., Excusing Murder? Conservative Jurors’ Acceptance of the Gay-Panic Defense,
21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 24, 24, 26, 30 (2015). This point will be discussed in greater
detail infra Part III.
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cal framework that justifies banning the gay and trans panic defenses through legislation. 35 This political framework balances the
traditional justifications for punishment (retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation) 36 with two cornerstone values:
(1) state accountability towards LGBTQ people and communities
(as well as other marginalized populations), and (2) equality 37 under the substantive criminal law. 38 As this Article discusses, upholding these values requires an analysis of how the state has
treated LGBTQ people in the past and what that treatment says
about whether the state is fulfilling what ought to be a baseline
normative commitment to respect LGBTQ civilians, and not sponsor, excuse, justify, or condone violence against them. 39 In the context of the gay and trans panic defenses, maintaining this normative commitment recognizes that it is necessary to prioritize the
demands of state accountability and equality for LGBTQ people
under the substantive criminal law over defendants’ due process
interest in presenting every legal strategy that might benefit their
case.
35F

36F

37F

38F

39F

Two caveats are in order. First, this Article is not asserting a
causal claim between the violence that LGBTQ victims in gay and
trans panic cases experience and the role of the state in the growth

35. See infra Part IV.
36. See Stephanos Bibas, Small Crimes, Big Injustices, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1036
(2019) (identifying “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation/reform” as
“four traditional justifications for punishment”); Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58
STAN. L. REV. 67, 69–76 (2005) (providing an overview of contemporary sentencing purposes).
37. As discussed in further detail infra Part IV, the conception of equality that this
Article envisions for this political framework is consistent with the substantive principle of
equality rather than the formal principle of equality. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 750 (2002) (“On the formal view, inequality consists of treating people differently across an irrelevant criterion; on the substantive view, the injury is subordinating one group to another.”).
38. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explain how penal codes would change in
contexts that do not involve the gay and trans panic defenses when equality is prioritized
as a value under the criminal law. As discussed further in infra Part IV, however, theoretical perspectives on criminal law tend to neglect equality as an underlying value of the substantive criminal law and place primacy on the traditional justifications for punishment.
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?, 102
VA. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (2016) (noting that “[c]riminal law theorists often aim to promote
one or another justification for punishment . . . [b]ut equality per se is all but invisible in
much substantive criminal law scholarship”). But see Butler, supra note 29 (making the case
for affirmative action in criminal law).
39. Thomas, supra note 13, at 1477 (recognizing “that one of the first duties of the state
is to protect citizens from whom its powers derive against random, unchecked violence by
other citizens, or by government officials”).
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of gay and trans panic as a concept and criminal defense. This Article is also not asserting a one-dimensional, causal claim that
medical definitions of gay and trans panic historically shaped and
continue to mold stigmatizing attitudes towards LGBTQ people in
the public, legal, and political spheres. 40 It is difficult to create this
directional story and these causal arguments are unnecessary to
establish the claims presented in this Article. Rather, the main
goal of this Article is to bring the historical connections between
the state and gay and trans panic to the surface in order to show
why the state has a distinct responsibility today to ban criminal
defenses that rely on those stigmatizing concepts.
40F

Second, this Article does not argue that the state is the only actor to blame for the growth of gay and trans panic as a medical
concept and criminal defense. Instead, this Article demonstrates
that the state is a key player in this story. As explained below, the
state had a central role in supporting several prominent doctors
who advanced stigmatizing definitions of gay and trans panic as
part of a broader state and social agenda to regulate and control
“sexual deviance.” 41 It is important not to lose sight of these historical connections when considering how the state should respond to
the gay and trans panic defenses today. 42
41F

42F

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by discussing
the origins of gay and trans panic as a medical concept in 1920.
Part II describes how prominent psychiatrists who worked in staterun hospitals and prisons advanced new meanings of “gay and
trans panic” between the 1940s and 1950s that placed the blame
on LGBTQ victims for the violence they experienced and stigmatized LGBTQ people as sexual aggressors. These alternative definitions were consistent with a then-growing consensus in the

40. This relationship is likely symbiotic in the sense that prevailing medical attitudes
towards LGBTQ people at the time both embodied and shaped how LGBTQ people were
treated and viewed in other domains, including the legal, public, and political domains. Foucault’s position on the symbiotic relationship between knowledge and power is instructive
on this point. See Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 1972–1977, at 78–108 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al., trans., 1972). Legal scholars have made similar arguments in
the context of reproduction. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,
267 (1992) (“In each culture, norms and practices of the community, including those of family, market, medicine, church, and state, combine to shape the social relations of reproduction.”).
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Part IV.
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United States psychiatric profession that homosexuality was a
mental disease. Part III then discusses how criminal defendants,
starting in the 1960s, relied on these shifting conceptions of gay
and trans panic as an ideological hook to legally justify and excuse
acts of violence against LGBTQ people. Finally, Part IV explains
why it is misguided to distance this history from defendants’ reliance on gay and trans panic strategies today. Based on this idea,
the analysis lays the groundwork for a normative political framework that justifies legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses.
I. THE ORIGINS OF “GAY AND TRANS PANIC” (1920)
In 1920, Edward J. Kempf coined the term “acute homosexual
panic” 43 as a psychosis based on case histories of nineteen World
War I veterans who had been admitted to St. Elizabeths Hospital
in Washington, D.C. 44 The fact that Kempf worked as a clinical
psychologist at St. Elizabeths Hospital 45 is an important link between the origins of gay and trans panic and the state.
43F

4F

45F

In 1855, Congress established St. Elizabeths Hospital (initially
called the Government Hospital for the Insane 46) as a psychiatric
hospital that was federally run and administered. 47 The hospital’s
initial mandate was to house individuals, most of whom were active members of the military and veterans, 48 under the jurisdiction
of the federal government and judged to be mentally ill. 49 By 1925,
the hospital had approximately four thousand patients and fifty
physicians. 50 Illustrating the influence of the hospital, each of the
46F

47F

48F

49F

50F

43. Burton S. Glick, Homosexual Panic: Clinical and Theoretical Considerations, 129 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 20, 21 (1959) (noting that Kempf was “apparently the originator of the term acute homosexual panic”).
44. See generally EDWARD J. KEMPF, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 477–515 (1920).
45. Id. at vii.
46. Surya Kanhouwa & Kenneth Gorelick, A Century of Pathology at Saint Elizabeths
Hospital, Washington, DC, 121 ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 84, 84 (1997).
47. Arthur D. Hill, Book Note, Insanity and the Criminal Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 167,
167 (1923). St. Elizabeths Hospital remained federally run until its hospital function was
transferred to the District of Columbia government in 1987. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 16.
48. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 56 (“Over the century-long association with the military,
usually more than half of St. Elizabeths patients at any given time were veterans.”); Martin
Summers, “Suitable Care of the African When Afflicted with Insanity”: Race, Madness, and
Social Order in Comparative Perspective, 84 BULL. HIST. MED. 58, 62 (2010).
49. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 56.
50. W.A. White, The New Saint Elizabeths Hospital, 80 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 503, 504
(1924).
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five superintendents during the hospital’s first century in operation were leaders in the mental health field and were elected to
serve as president of the American Psychiatric Association
(“APA”). 51
51F

Scholars have explored historical connections between scientific
research conducted in St. Elizabeths Hospital and the use of medicine to control and mistreat racial, ethnic, sexual, and gender minorities who were perceived as threatening to the social order in
the United States. 52 Published studies reveal that as early as the
1920s, doctors at St. Elizabeths Hospital characterized homosexuality as a biological “deficiency” and identified homosexuality as a
cause for delusions and hallucinations of male veteran patients
who did not conform to traditional masculine norms. 53 As discussed
later in more detail, over the course of decades, hundreds if not
thousands of LGBTQ patients at St. Elizabeths Hospital were subjected to draconian medical treatments intended to “cure” their
“deviant” sexualities and gender identities, including electric
shock, hydrotherapy, and insulin therapy. 54
52F

53F

54F

51. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 94; MATTHEW GAMBINO, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT,
FEVERED DECISIONS: RACE, ETHICS, AND CLINICAL VULNERABILITY IN THE MALARIAL
TREATMENT OF NEUROSYPHILIS, 1922–1953, at 40 (July–Aug. 2015), https://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.451 [https://perma.cc/59BR-GCZ4]. Moreover, due to its top
reputation, many leading medical practitioners and scholars conducted research while
working at or visiting St. Elizabeths Hospital. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 118.
52. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 108 (“Race, gender and sexual orientation prejudices on
the part of the staff . . . informed the treatment plans”). With regard to race, scholars have
called attention to how the misguided ideology of St. Elizabeths Hospital doctors who
equated mental abnormality in white individuals with normality in black individuals influenced the management of black bodies at the hospital in its early decades. Summers, supra
note 48, at 86. Since opening in 1855, St. Elizabeths Hospital did not exclude African Americans from being admitted, although the hospital remained segregated by race until 1954.
LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 83. Scholars and commentators have described how racism
among doctors and staff shaped the treatment of African American patients in St. Elizabeths Hospital. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 83; GAMBINO, supra note 51, at 40. In addition,
the available historical evidence suggests that for much of its history, African American
patients were more often assigned to manual labor within the hospital whereas white patients had opportunities to work as carpenters, tailors, and seamstresses. LEAVITT, supra
note 20, at 89. See also, e.g., John E. Lind, Phylogenetic Elements in the Psychoses of the
Negro, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 303 (1917) (“The Negro, studied judiciously by those who
are competent, appears to be at a much lower cultural level than the Caucasian.”). John
Lind worked a psychiatrist at St. Elizabeths Hospital. Matthew Gambino, “The Savage
Heart Beneath the Civilized Exterior”: Race, Citizenship, and Mental Illness in Washington
D.C., 1900–1940, DISABILITY STUD. Q. (Summer 2008).
53. See, e.g., S.A. Silk, The Compensatory Mechanism of Delusions and Hallucinations,
77 AM. J. INSANITY 523, 530 (1921).
54. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 20, 110; Andrew Giambrone, LGBTQ People Suffered
Traumatic Treatments at St. Elizabeths Hospital for the Mentally Ill, WASH. CITY PAPER
(May 31, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/article/21007233/ind
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It is noteworthy that gay and trans panic has its origins in psychological research from the 1920s. The 1920s were a distinct period in which psychological theories emerged as a significant paradigm to explain crime, including then-criminalized homosexuality. 55 After World War I, physicians documented many cases in
which returning soldiers had developed neurotic disorders during
combat as a result of psychological trauma (commonly known as
“shell shock”). 56 As then-prevailing theories of phrenology and anthropometry 57 were unable to explain these problems, medical experts in psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis assumed a
leading role in creating new theories and responses. 58 Illustrating
connections to the state, thousands of veterans suffering from
“shell shock” were admitted and treated by doctors at St. Elizabeths Hospital after World War I. 59
5F

56F

57F

58F

59F

In 1920, Kempf described “acute homosexual panic” in a way
that differs in two significant respects from how gay and trans
panic is typically understood in criminal cases today. 60 First, the
driving impulse underlying Kempf’s conception was distinct from
the driving impulse of today’s defendants who claim gay and trans
panic to cause harm on LGBTQ people. Kempf characterized ho60F

ependent-scholars-uncover-the-traumatic-treatments-lgbtq-people-suffered-at-st-elizabe
ths [https://perma.cc/N5NJ-WAZG]. It is impossible to know the exact number of LGBTQ
patients who were admitted to St. Elizabeths Hospital because of their sexual orientation
and gender identities because many records have been destroyed. Id. Unlike African American patients, the available historical evidence does not suggest that LGBTQ patients were
segregated in St. Elizabeths Hospital. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 83.
55. Woods, supra note 31, at 685.
56. RUTH LEYS, TRAUMA: A GENEALOGY 2 (2000). See generally Otto Van der Hart et
al., Somatoform Disassociation in Traumatized World War I Combat Soldiers: A Neglected
Clinical Heritage, 1 J. TRAUMA & DISSOCIATION 33 (2000).
57. Phrenology is “the study of the shape of the skull and its relation to character
traits.” Cooper Ellenberg, Lie Detection: A Changing of the Guard in the Quest for Truth in
Court?, 33 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 140 (2009). Anthropometry is “the measurement of
body parts for the purpose of understanding human variation.” Cary Federman, A “Morphological Sphinx”: On the Silence of the Assassin Leon Czolgosz, 2 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL.
CRIMINOLOGY 100, 125 (2010).
58. Eli Zaretsky, Psychoanalysis, Vulnerability, and War, in FIRST DO NO HARM: THE
PARADOXICAL ENCOUNTERS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, WARMAKING, AND RESISTANCE 177, 180
(Adrienne Harris & Steven Botticelli eds., 2010) (noting that after the start of World War I,
“psychiatrists increasingly turned toward psychological explanations” to explain shell
shock); Woods, supra note 31, at 685 & n.100.
59. LEAVITT, supra note 20, at 56.
60. Lee, supra note 1, at 475–76, 483, 488; Peter Nicolas, “They Say He’s Gay”: The
Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Orientation, 37 GA. L. REV. 793, 810 (2003) (noting that
there are several ways in which the concept of gay panic as used in criminal cases today
differs from how Edward Kempf described the term).
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mosexual panic as a psychosis “due to the pressure of uncontrollable perverse sexual cravings.” 61 He described that this condition
affected “latent homosexuals,” which was a Freudian concept that
posited that for some individuals who thought of themselves as
heterosexual, homosexual desires remained in their repressed unconscious and were capable of shaping human behavior under certain conditions. 62 Kempf was especially concerned about the alleged prevalence of homosexual panic in environments where men
and women were segregated for long periods of time, such as military camps and ships, prisons, schools, and asylums. 63
61F

62F

63F

Second, the potential for violence in Kempf’s conception of acute
homosexual panic was largely inward—namely, self-harm—rather
than outward harm in the form of unwanted sexual advances towards others. In Kempf’s view, acute homosexual panic was rooted
in a person’s co-existing fear of their own homosexuality coupled
with a fear of heterosexuality. 64 Kempf argued that this tension did
not necessarily trigger homicidal or violent reactions. In fact, none
of the case histories in his scientific research involved such violence. 65 Rather, typical symptoms included depression, anxiety,
and suicidal impulses. 66
64F

65F

6F

Nonetheless, Kempf still defined heterosexuality as the norm
and placed primacy on traditional norms of sex, sexuality, and gender. 67 Kempf’s treatment recommendations for “acute homosexual
panic” illustrate these points. He stressed that the future of a soldier or sailor diagnosed with “acute homosexual panic” is the “most
insecure” 68 without “fortunate sexual adjustment,” 69 which in
Kempf’s view “require[d] controls and reenforcement [sic] to overcome dangers and become refined.” 70 Kempf further emphasized
that society should “encouage [sic] and promote the development
of heterosexual potency in order to prevent biological abortions
67F

68F

69F

70F

61.
62.

KEMPF, supra note 44, at 477.
See Leon Salzman, The Concept of Latent Homosexuality, 17
PSYCHOANALYSIS 161, 162, 164 (1957).
63. KEMPF, supra note 44, at 477.
64. Id. at 511.
65. Nicolas, supra note 60, at 810.
66. KEMPF, supra note 44, at 511.
67. STEPHEN TOMSEN, VIOLENCE, PREJUDICE, AND SEXUALITY 107 (2009).
68. KEMPF, supra note 44, at 515.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 719.

AM. J.
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through fear of the responsibilities of heterosexuality—pregnancy,
labor, parenthood.” 71
71F

The scientific community did not pay much attention to “acute
homosexual panic” in the decades after Kempf introduced the term
in 1920. 72 As the next Part explores, this left space for medical experts to advance alternative meanings of the concept that stigmatized LGBTQ people as sexual aggressors and placed the blame on
them for the violence that they experienced.
72F

II. THE STATE AGENDA TO REGULATE “SEXUAL DEVIANCE” AND
NEW DEFINITIONS OF GAY AND TRANS PANIC (1940S–1950S)
This Part looks to medical literature in the 1940s and 1950s to
advance two key points. First, the analysis shows that several
prominent psychiatrists at state-run hospitals and prisons in the
1940s and 1950s advanced new definitions of gay and trans panic
consistent with how the concept is largely understood in criminal
cases today—namely, as violent situations triggered by the unwanted sexual advances of LGBTQ people. 73 These stigmatizing
conceptions of gay and trans panic fell in line with a then-growing
consensus in the United States psychiatric profession that homosexuality (which was then generally understood to include gender
nonconformity) 74 was a mental illness. Second, supported by this
pathological model of homosexuality, these newly emerging and
stigmatizing definitions of gay and trans panic offered legal and
social justifications for prominent psychiatrists at state-run hospitals and prisons to apply brutal and dangerous medical interventions on LGBTQ patients. In this regard, gay and trans panic ideas
73F

74F

71. Id. at 719–20.
72. Glick, supra note 43, at 27; id. at 20 (recognizing that only one paper had been
dedicated to the topic of homosexual panic since 1939 and 1959); Ben Karpman, Mediate
Psychotherapy and the Acute Homosexual Panic (Kempf’s Disease), 98 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 493, 494 (1943) (noting that “no one, so far as I know, has taken up the
problem of acute homosexual panic since Kempf first formulated it in 1920”).
73. Lee, supra note 1, at 476 (“More recently, the term ‘gay panic’ has been deployed to
refer to the alleged loss of self-control provoked in a heterosexual man by a gay man’s unwanted sexual advance.”); see also Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation’s Privileged
Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, “Homosexual Panic,” and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 200 (2000) (“In short, homosexual
panic evolved from an internally induced psychological disorder with external symptoms to
become predominantly characterized as an immediate and irrational reaction to real, external stimuli.”).
74. See Ben-Asher, supra note 23, at 82 (noting that the idea that “gender identity” was
distinct from biological sex assigned at birth did not emerge until the 1950s).
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provided an ideological justification for state violence against
LGBTQ people.
A. Growing Pathologization of Homosexuality
Before developing both of these points, for contextual purposes
this section summarizes important developments regarding the
treatment of LGBTQ people in medicine and law during the 1940s
and 1950s. In 1941, Hervey Cleckley released groundbreaking research that offered the first clinical profile of the “psychopath.” 75
“Forensic psychologists soon applied and honed this profile to [examine] connections between psychopathology and crime.” 76
75F

76F

Many prominent psychiatrists applied new ideas of psychopathy
to redefine then-criminalized homosexuality as a mental disease
that could not be cured. 77 Their views soon became the dominant
way of understanding homosexuality in the United States psychiatric profession, 78 reflected by the inclusion of homosexuality as a
mental disorder in the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (“DSM”) between 1952 and 1973. 79 During this
period, several prominent psychiatrists who specialized in homosexuality released published works that advanced this pathological
view. 80
7F

78F

79F

80F

There were significant parallels between the increasing hostility
towards LGBTQ people in the psychiatric profession and the law. 81
In the 1940s and 1950s, every state criminalized same-sex sex, and
many localities prohibited certain gender nonconforming expression, such as cross-dressing. 82 “Between 1946 and 1959 . . . twenty81F

82F

75. HERVEY M. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO REINTERPRET THE SOCALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY 238–55 (1941) (introducing and describing a clinical
profile of the psychopath).
76. Woods, supra note 31, at 687–88.
77. Id. at 688.
78. RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF
DIAGNOSIS 28 (1981).
79. Id. at 39, 40.
80. See, e.g., EDMUND BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE? (1956);
IRVING BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTHIC STUDY OF HOMOSEXUALS (1962);
CHARLES W. SOCARIDES, THE OVERT HOMOSEXUAL (1968).
81. Woods, supra note 31, at 689.
82. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
631, 660–63.
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nine states enacted sexual psychopath laws.” 83 These laws generally took two forms. First, any person who was charged with a
crime and found by a jury to be a “sexual psychopath” could be
handed over to a state’s department of public health, perhaps indefinitely, until that person was “cured.” 84 Second, a civil variation
allowed for the “psychiatric commitment of sexual psychopaths,
perhaps indefinitely, regardless of whether they were charged with
a crime.” 85 Although broadly written to apply to many different
types of crimes, sexual psychopath laws were most heavily enforced against gay men. 86 Medical experts who adopted the view
that homosexuality was a mental illness commonly testified as expert witnesses in these cases. 87
83F

84F

85F

86F

87F

There were also important parallels in the 1940s and 1950s between the growing psychiatric consensus that homosexuality was
a mental disease, public attitudes towards homosexuality, and the
rise of early lesbian and gay social movements. Many scholars describe World War II as a catalyst for the growth of visible lesbian
and gay communities in United States cities, 88 although several
neighborhoods like Greenwich Village in New York City (where the
Stonewall Inn is located) had a strong lesbian and gay presence
even before the war. 89 Migration brought about by the war, as well
as industrialization, opened new possibilities for lesbians and gays
to congregate in city neighborhoods. 90 By the 1950s, relocation to
city neighborhoods was a common phenomenon. 91 Many LGBTQ
8F

89F

90F

91F

83. Id.
84. Estelle B. Freedman, Uncontrolled Desires: The Response to the Sexual Psychopath,
1920–1960, in FEMINISM, SEXUALITY, AND POLITICS: ESSAYS BY ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN 121,
132 (2006).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 132; Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., An Evaluation of the Homosexual Offender,
41 MINN. L. REV. 187, 195 (1957) (“The practical fact of the matter would seem to be that
most of the sodomy laws, and the special sex psychopath laws, are designed primarily for
the control of the persistent homosexual offender.”).
87. J. PAUL DE RIVER, THE SEXUAL CRIMINAL: A PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY 245–54
(1949) (offering guidance to medical experts who are called as expert witnesses in cases
involving sex crimes).
88. See generally ALLAN BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN
AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II (1990).
89. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING
OF THE GAY MALE WORLD 1890–1940, at 237 (1994).
90. BÉRUBÉ, supra note 88, at 245–46.
91. Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,
in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND SEXUALITY: A READER 143, 156 (Peter Aggleton & Richard Parker
eds., 1999).
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people embraced the freedom, anonymity, and safety in numbers
that city life provided. 92
92F

At the same time, lesbian and gay mobilization also emerged
with the formation of the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of
Bilitis in the 1950s. 93 These early lesbian and gay social movement
groups prioritized refuting the dominant psychiatric view that homosexuality was a mental disease and eliminating the stigma of
disease attached to homosexuality. 94 In addition to creating public
forums, these organizations released publications that allowed dissenting medical experts to present research that challenged the
prevailing psychiatric view that homosexuality was a mental illness. 95
93F

94F

95F

Scholars have connected the strong public opinion during the
mid-twentieth century that homosexuality was a mental disease to
a wave of moral panic about sex crimes that swept across the
United States immediately after World War II. 96 “Once the war
concluded, Americans faced the challenge of returning to normalcy
both inside and outside of the home.” 97 Strengthening traditional
family values was one means by which people attempted to return
to normalcy. 98 The prioritization of family values fed anxieties
about populations that were perceived to threaten those values, including gay men. 99
96F

97F

98F

9F

Illustrating overlap between medicine and law enforcement, in
the late 1930s prominent forensic psychiatrist J. Paul de River was
hired by the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) as the first
official police psychiatrist in a United States police department. 100
De River created the LAPD’s Sex Offense Bureau and consulted on
10F

92. BÉRUBÉ, supra note 88, at 245.
93. D’EMILIO, supra note 12, at 2.
94. BAYER, supra note 78, at 67–100 (discussing challenges to the psychiatric profession
in lesbian and gay social movements from the 1950s to the 1970s).
95. Id. at 73–75.
96. It is important to recognize that the medicalization of homosexuality at times also
operated as a way for researchers and members of the public who held more favorable attitudes towards homosexuality to criticize its criminalization and incarceration of LGBTQ
civilians. See, e.g., Glueck, supra note 86, at 193; Julian L. Woodward, Changing Ideas on
Mental Illness and Its Treatment, 16 AM. SOC. REV. 443, 445 (1951).
97. Woods, supra note 31, at 689.
98. See BÉRUBÉ, supra note 88, at 258.
99. Id.
100. Eugene D. Williams, Introduction to DE RIVER, supra note 87, at xiii; Sex Crimes
Clinic Opens: Chief David Starts Classification and Control Bureau, L.A. TIMES, July 30,
1938.
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thousands of crime scenes with a sexual component. 101 Illustrating
the stigma attached to then-criminalized homosexuality, de River
argued that any homosexual who refused treatment was “a criminal in the true sense as he has no regard or respect for existing
laws, made or enforced by the majority of our society.” 102
10F

102F

The “Lavender Scare” of the 1950s is one of the most vivid examples of the overlap between increasing hostility towards LGBTQ
people in medicine, law, and the state. 103 In the wake of anticommunism, there was an organized effort in the federal government
and the military to remove and persecute lesbian and gay employees and active service members. 104 Several prominent psychiatrists
consulted with federal investigators and testified during congressional hearings. 105 A 1950 Senate subcommittee report on “Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in the Government” noted a consensus among psychiatrists that homosexuality
was evidence of a personality “flaw” and recommended that “overt
homosexuals . . . be considered as proper cases for medical and psychiatric treatment.” 106 As a result of heightened investigations and
screens, more than 1000 federal employees either resigned or were
terminated, and over 2000 active service members were discharged
from the military during the early 1950s for allegations relating to
homosexuality. 107
103F

104F

105F

106F

107F

Increasing hostility towards homosexuality in the medical, legal,
political, and public spheres facilitated the same forms of state
violence against LGBTQ people that triggered the Stonewall
101. Williams, supra note 100, at xiii.
102. J. PAUL DE RIVER, CRIME AND THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH 82 (1958).
103. D’EMILIO, supra note 12, at 52; Mary Ziegler, What Is Sexual Orientation, 106 KY.
L.J. 61, 68 (2018) (“Because homosexuals were sick and morally weak, McCarthy argued
that they were far more likely to endorse Communism or fall prey to blackmail schemes.”).
104. See generally DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR
PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2004). It is important
to note that efforts to remove lesbians and gays in the federal government and the military
also occurred in the late 1940s, before the Lavender Scare in the 1950s. D’EMILIO, supra
note 12, at 44–45.
105. Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government, Subcomm. on
Investigations, S. Comm. on Expenditures in Exec. Dep’ts, S. DOC. NO. 241, at 2 (2d Sess.
1950) (“A number of eminent physicians and psychiatrists, who are recognized authorities
on this subject, were consulted and some of these authorities testified before the subcommittee in executive session.”).
106. Id. at 3.
107. JOHNSON, supra note 104, at 166. As scholars have discussed, it is impossible to
know the exact number of lesbian and gay federal employees who were affected by this purge
because many agencies did not keep records of the dismissals. Id.; see also D’EMILIO, supra
note 12, at 44.
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Riots—namely, police mistreatment and abuse. As the next section
discusses, this overlap also enabled other forms of state violence in
the form of brutal and dangerous medical treatments intended to
change LGBTQ people’s sexual orientation and gender identities. 108
108F

B. New Definitions of Gay and Trans Panic
With the growing pathological model of homosexuality in the
1940s and 1950s, medical experts advanced new definitions of gay
and trans panic that demonized LGBTQ people as sexual aggressors and shifted the blame on them for the violence they experienced in state institutions and society more generally. Illustrating
connections to the state, several prominent psychiatrists that advanced these alternative definitions worked at state-run hospitals
and prisons. These psychiatrists subjected both involuntarily and
voluntarily committed LGBTQ patients who were diagnosed with
gay and trans panic, or blamed for the violent responses of others
due to gay and trans panic, to various draconian medical treatments. Common examples included drugs and chemicals to induce
vomiting, electric shock, hydrotherapy, castration, hysterectomy,
clitoridectomy, and lobotomy. 109 Towing the line between state and
private violence, pressure to undergo these treatments not only
came from doctors in state institutions and judges, but also from
family and community members after LGBTQ peoples’ sexual orientations or gender identities became known to others. 110
109F

10F

In 1943, Dr. Benjamin Karpman—an influential clinical psychologist who worked with Edward J. Kempf at federally run St.
Elizabeths Hospital 111—published one of the few articles dedicated
1F

108. D’EMILIO, supra note 12, at 18; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and
the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946–1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 715 (1997); Freedman,
supra note 84, at 130; Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion
Therapy Bans, 68 ALA. L. REV. 793, 801–02 (2017).
109. Lori Messinger, A Historical Perspective, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER
EXPRESSION IN SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 25 (Deana F. Morrow & Lori Messinger eds., 2006);
George, supra note 108, at 801–02.
110. See D’EMILIO, supra note 12, at 18 (noting that after the spread of sexual psychopath laws between the 1940s and 1960s, “some families committed their gay members to
asylums”); Eskridge, supra note 108, at 715.
111. Benjamin Karpman, From the Autobiography of a Bandit: Toward the Psychogenesis of So-Called Psychopathic Behavior, 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 305, 305 (1946) (noting that Karpman was associated with St. Elizabeths Hospital “for over twenty-five years
as a Senior Medical Officer and Psychotherapist”).
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to “acute homosexual panic” between the 1920s and 1960s. 112 The
timing of Karpman’s publication is important because it connects
shifting definitions of “gay and trans panic” to emerging concepts
in psychopathy that stigmatized LGBTQ people as mentally ill
“sexual deviants.” In the 1940s and 1950s, Karpman emerged as a
leader in applying new concepts of psychopathy to sex offenses, including then-criminalized homosexuality. 113 During this period, an
increasing number of lesbians and gays were admitted and treated
for homosexuality in St. Elizabeths Hospital (sometimes for indefinite periods), including under the District of Columbia’s “sexual
psychopath” law. 114
12F

13F

14F

Karpman’s 1943 article focused on a case study of a thirty-fouryear-old male who worked as an engineer and was married to a
woman. 115 The case narrative described the man as depressed, unable to sleep, and worried about his financial condition and his
family. 116 Eventually, he became introverted, talked to himself,
could not perform sexually in his marriage, and expressed “pathological sex trends.” 117 Those trends included saying that he was a
woman and having hallucinations of seeing naked men dancing
who, at times, did sexual things to him. 118 The patient tried to commit suicide after he was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital. 119
15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

112. See generally Karpman, supra note 72. Karpman noted that Kempf had only provided the “bare outlines” of “acute homosexual panic” and that “because the field is so promising, it seems desirable to take up the further study of it in detail.” Id. at 494.
113. See BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSES 203‒30 (1954)
(discussing overt and latent homosexuality); id. at 609‒13 (discussing homosexuality). See
generally Benjamin Karpman, The Sexual Psychopath, 42 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 194 (1951); Susan R. Schmeiser, The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy, Sexuality, and the Rise of Medico-Legal Reasoning, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163, 193–96 (2008)
(describing Karpman as a leading figure in the study of psychopathy and its relationship to
crime).
114. LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 4–5 (2015)
(discussing how under the Miller Act, a “sexual psychopath . . . could be committed to the
criminal ward of the District of Columbia’s St. Elizabeth’s psychiatric hospital”); LEAVITT,
supra note 20, at 20; Winfred Overholser, Some Problems of the “Criminal Insane” at Saint
Elizabeth’s Hospital, 22 MED. ANNALS D.C. 347, 349 (1953) (“Congress in enacting the Miller
Act denominated St. Elizabeths Hospital . . . as a place of treatment”); see also, e.g., Charles
Francis & Pate Felts, Archive Activism: Vergangenheitsbewaltigunt!, QED, Spring 2017, at
28, 29 (discussing the case of Thomas H. Tattersall, a “self-admitted homosexual” who was
admitted to St. Elizabeths Hospital after being fired from his job at the Department of Commerce for the crime of homosexuality and administered repeated “insulin shock therapy”
sessions).
115. Karpman, supra note 72, at 494.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 494, 502.
119. Id. at 494–95.
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Karpman became involved in the case after the man’s wife threatened to report the hospital ward physician to the superintendent if
more was not done for her husband. 120
120F

Similar to Kempf, Karpman explained the patient’s mental condition in terms of his latent homosexuality conflicting with feelings
of guilt from his conscience. 121 Unlike Kempf, however, Karpman
linked those feelings of guilt to not only the patient’s same-sex fantasies, but also to the patient’s alleged unwanted sexual advances
towards others. 122 In his analysis of the patient’s “[p]anic and [p]sychotic [t]rends,” 123 Karpman stressed that the patient’s “homosexual trend” appeared not only in his same-sex fantasies, but also in
his wife’s statement that the patient had been accused of sexually
approaching a male sailor. 124 Karpman further described that the
patient would wander about at night and “hang around the beds of
other patients.” 125 On one occasion, another male patient knocked
out two of the patient’s teeth after assuming that he came to his
bed for “homosexual purposes.” 126
12F

12F

123F

124F

125F

126F

It is important to acknowledge that the role of the unwanted sexual advance in Karpman’s diagnosis of the patient was different
from how unwanted sexual advances are used to support gay and
trans panic defenses today. Karpman used the sexual advance as
evidence of the patient’s mental condition as opposed to the mental
state of the person who reacted violently. Nonetheless, Karpman’s
research embodies an important shift to link the concept of homosexual panic with sexual advances towards others.
Later medical research went one step further to connect the
meaning of gay and trans panic with the mental state of both latent
homosexuals and heterosexuals who reacted violently to the alleged unwanted sexual advances of openly LGBTQ people. In 1951,
Russell Dinerstein and Bernard Glueck, Jr.—forensic psychiatrists
who worked at the psychiatric clinic at Sing Sing Prison operated
by the State of New York—published an article that characterized

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 495.
Id. at 493, 503.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 503.
Id.
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“homosexual panic” as a male inmate’s violent mental state triggered by the unwanted sexual advance of a gay man. 127 The fact
that Dinerstein and Glueck worked at the psychiatric clinic at Sing
Sing Prison is an important element that connects the state to
these shifting conceptions of gay and trans panic that more aggressively demonized LGBTQ people.
127F

Dinerstein and Glueck’s association of “homosexual panic” with
violent reactions triggered by the unwanted sexual advances of gay
men stems from the specific institutional context in which their
research focused—prison. 128 Dinerstein and Glueck stressed that
“acute anxiety attacks” rooted in “homosexual conflicts” raised security concerns for the entire prison community. 129 Ironically,
Glueck’s later published work indicates that his concerns about
housing gay men in prisons was actually part of his broader critique of using the criminal law to incarcerate gay men. 130 Nonetheless, his research accepted a pathological definition of homosexuality and advocated for applying invasive medical treatments on
gay men, such as electroshock therapy. 131
128F

129F

130F

13F

Unlike Kempf’s research, Dinerstein and Glueck recognized that
the prison community included both “overt homosexuals” and “latent homosexual[s].” 132 With regard to “homosexual panic,” Dinerstein and Glueck described that it was a “common occurrence in
prison for an overt homosexual to make a sexual approach” to a
“latent homosexual.” 133 In their view, this situation “produces a rather severe disturbance in the individual who is approached” and
can often result in “violence and assaultiveness.” 134 Dinerstein and
Glueck further described that the propositioned men often asserted
that they were “not homosexuals” and felt “completely justified in
physically warding off such attacks.” 135 Consistent with stereotypes of gay men as sexual predators, the researchers noted the
132F

13F

134F

135F

127. Russell H. Dinerstein & Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., Sub-Coma Insulin Therapy in the
Treatment of Homosexual Panic States, 1951 PROC. AM. PRISON ASS’N 86, 87–89.
128. Glueck also makes this point in a separate publication. See Glueck, supra note 86,
at 208–09.
129. Dinerstein & Glueck, supra note 127, at 86.
130. Glueck, supra note 86, at 205–07.
131. Id. at 209.
132. Dinerstein & Glueck, supra note 127, at 87, 89. Dinerstein and Glueck described
“latent homosexuals” as people “who may have homosexuality as a problem but ha[ve] never
been consciously aware of it.” Id.
133. Id. at 87.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 88.
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possibility that an “overt homosexual may have some awareness
that another man might be a suitable partner” in prison based on
“some intangible insight.” 136
136F

Another important development in Dinerstein and Glueck’s research is that it recognized an additional variation of homosexual
panic—when “overt homosexual[s]” make an unwanted sexual advance “to an inmate who is not homosexual” (overt or latent). 137
The researchers noted that “[t]olerance and understanding” were
“rare attributes” in prison and that the approached man “usually
becomes extremely violent, and feels no hesitation in striking
back.” 138 They stressed that such fights are a serious security concern for prison management because they “can quickly flare up.” 139
137F

138F

139F

Dinerstein and Glueck’s recommendations for responding to “homosexual panic” in prison, which were informed by the results of
their intervention program at Sing Sing Prison, reveal important
connections between gay and trans panic ideas and state violence. 140 Consistent with the emerging psychiatric consensus that
homosexuality was a mental illness, the researchers described
overt homosexuality as a “type of disorder.” 141 They further noted
that because treatments for overt homosexuality were “notoriously
unsuccessful,” they “handle[d] the problem” by isolating openly gay
men (especially effeminate ones) from the prison population. 142 The
men were then referred for psychiatric evaluation. 143
140F

14F

142F

143F

In two ways, this response placed the blame on openly gay men
for the violence they experienced in prison and framed them as a
security threat. 144 First, this response demonized gay men as suffering from an incurable mental illness. Second, this response accepted the idea that violence was an understandable response to
“overt homosexuals” in prison given the lack of tolerance in prison
towards those who had this incurable “disorder.”
14F

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 86, 89, 91.
141. Id. at 87.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 89.
144. Comstock, supra note 28, at 97 (“The justification for self-defense in these incidents
is not the physical threat posed by the ‘advance,’ but the sexual identity of the victim.”).

WOODS 543 AC (DO NOT DELETE)

856

2/17/2020 1:55 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:833

For latent homosexuals, Dinerstein and Glueck described that
their therapeutic program involved “situational manipulation,
physical therapy, and psychotherapy.” 145 While participating in
the program, inmates would be separated from the general population and put into a prison hospital ward for several weeks. 146
Treatment consisted of giving them small doses of insulin, three
times a day, for one and one-half to two hours before meals as well
as a sedative during the day and night. 147 While in the program,
the inmates would undergo psychological therapy to “talk about
the causes of their upset.” 148 The researchers noted that over a
course of a year, they treated approximately thirty inmates. 149
145F

146F

147F

148F

149F

In sum, as the psychiatric profession and the law became more
hostile towards LGBTQ people in the 1940s and 1950s, medical experts in state-run institutions advanced stigmatizing definitions of
gay and trans panic that demonized LGBTQ victims as sexual aggressors and shifted the blame on LGBTQ people for the violence
they experienced. As the next Part discusses, these new definitions
of gay and trans panic provided an ideological hook for criminal
defendants in the 1960s to legally justify and excuse the violence
they committed against LGBTQ victims. 150
150F

III. “GAY AND TRANS PANIC” AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
AND EXCUSE FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST LGBTQ PEOPLE
(1960S–PRESENT)
The lack of a cohesive scientific definition of gay and trans panic
in the psychiatric profession made it easier for criminal defendants
and defense attorneys in the 1960s to take advantage of more stigmatizing interpretations of the concept in order to legally justify
and excuse violence against LGBTQ victims. 151 In this regard, gay
15F

145. Dinerstein & Glueck, supra note 127, at 89.
146. Id. at 90.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Dinerstein and Glueck discussed that many inmates were scared of being transferred to state hospitals because the inmates had heard stories of the hospitals’ poor conditions. Id. at 89.
150. The analysis in this section focuses on cases involving the “gay and trans panic”
defenses that emerged between the 1960s and 1970s. For more recent examples of cases
involving gay and trans panic defenses, see Wodda and Panfil, supra note 28, at 943–56.
151. Bagnall et al., supra note 28, at 502 (noting that “there is no agreed-upon definition
of homosexual panic as a legal defense in criminal trials”); Comstock, supra note 28, at 89
(“Attorneys have chosen . . . to lend their own interpretations to and shape homosexual
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and trans panic ideas not only justified state violence against
LGBTQ people in the form of draconian medical treatments. Rather, these stigmatizing ideas—advanced by doctors who worked
for and conducted research in state-run hospitals and prisons—
also blurred the distinction between state and private violence.
One caveat is necessary before developing these points. In general, discussions of the gay and trans panic defenses appear in appellate court opinions, and those cases usually involve defendants’
unsuccessful uses of the defenses or cases in which defendants are
challenging their convictions on other grounds. If the defendant is
acquitted, the defendant will not appeal, and the government cannot appeal. 152 Given the limitations of available historical records,
especially at the trial court level, 153 it is impossible to know how
frequently the gay and trans panic defenses were used or successful in the past. 154 For these reasons, available appellate court opinions in which discussions of gay and trans panic defenses appear
may not be entirely representative. 155 At the same time, this Article is not making any causal arguments that rely on those cases.
The decisions still provide important insight into how defendants
relied on medical expertise to support the defenses over time.
152F

153F

154F

15F

Most scholars date the first published court decision to explicitly
mention gay and trans panic concepts to the 1967 California case
of People v. Rodriguez. 156 As early as the 1950s, however, defendants charged with muder constructed legal defenses based on the
156F

panic to the needs of their clients.”).
152. Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 267 (1996)
(“[W]hen a defendant is acquitted by a judge or jury, the prosecution may not appeal.”).
153. WOODS, SEARS & MALLORY, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that “most cases in which
defendants successfully raise gay and trans panic defenses never result in a court opinion”).
154. Wodda & Panfil, supra note 28, at 943–56 (noting that “it is difficult to determine
exactly how often the gay panic defense has been used and, when used, how ‘successful’ it
has been”).
155. Salerno et al., supra note 34, at 25 (noting that statistics from appellate court cases
“might underrepresent the true number of jury trials in which the gay-panic defense is invoked successfully, because defendants who are successful at trial will not have convictions
to appeal”).
156. 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Bagnall et al., supra note 28, at 499 n.4
(“The first reported judicial mention of homosexual panic came in People v. Rodriguez.”);
Lee, supra note 1, at 491 (“Beginning in 1967, male defendants charged with murdering gay
men began to utilize the concept of homosexual panic . . . .”); Perkiss, supra note 28, at 796
(“Commentators have identified People v. Rodriguez as the first reported judicial mention
of homosexual panic.”).
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idea that LGBTQ victims made unwanted sexual advances towards them. 157 It does not appear, however, that defendants in
these earlier decisions relied on newly emerging definitions of gay
and trans panic that more aggressively stigmatized LGBTQ people
or on mental health professionals as expert witnesses to support
panic claims. Rather, defendants rooted their legal strategies in
the law of assault and self-defense, specifically describing the alleged sexual advances as “homosexual assaults.” 158
157F

158F

As discussed previously, the idea that homosexuality was a mental disease became the dominant view in the United States psychiatric profession during the late 1950s and 1960s. 159 At the same
time, lesbian and gay mobilization and lesbian and gay neighborhoods became more increasingly visible. 160 These developments
had important connections to public opinion about homosexuality
in the late 1960s. For instance, in 1967—only two years before the
Stonewall Riots—CBS News aired a forty-five-minute special
called The Homosexuals. 161 The special stressed within its first
thirty seconds the “growing public concern about homosexuals in
society [and] about their increasing visibility.” 162 Based on the results of a commissioned survey into public attitudes towards homosexuality, the special reported that “2 out of 3 of Americans look
upon homosexuals with disgust, discomfort or fear; 1 out of 10 says
hatred; [and] a vast majority believe that homosexuality is an illness.” 163 The special further reported that “Americans consider homosexuality more harmful to society than adultery, abortion, or
prostitution.” 164
159F

160F

16F

162F

163F

164F

Paralleling these developments, published court decisions
started to emerge in the 1960s in which defendants who killed

157. See, e.g., People v. Nash, 338 P.2d 416, 417–18 (Cal. 1959) (en banc); Burns v. State,
87 So. 2d 681, 684–85 (Miss. 1956).
158. See, e.g., Edmonds v. U.S., 260 F.2d 474, 475–76 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (involving a defendant who killed a gay male victim and argued self-defense based on the contention that the victim made a series of “homosexual advances” towards the defendant);
Burns, 87 So. 2d at 685 (involving a defendant who killed a gay male victim and argued selfdefense based on the contention that the victim attempted “homosexual assault upon him”).
159. BAYER, supra note 78, at 29.
160. See supra Section II.A.
161. CBS NEWS REPORTS, The Homosexuals, 1967, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z
WNEdoXo0Yg [https://perma.cc/4RU9-AUJJ].
162. Id. at 0:20–0:25.
163. Id. at 6:40–6:53.
164. Id. at 0:30–0:42.

WOODS 543 AC (DO NOT DELETE)

2/17/2020 1:55 PM

“GAY AND TRANS PANIC” DEFENSES

2020]

859

LGBTQ victims turned to the law of insanity to construct legal defenses. Unlike earlier “homosexual assault” cases, defendants relied on more aggressive definitions of gay and trans panic that
characterized LGBTQ people as sexual aggressors, in line with the
ideas being advanced by prominent psychiatrists who worked for
state-run institutions. 165 Illustrating the centrality of medical expertise in these cases, defendants relied on psychiatrists as expert
witnesses to provide testimony in support of their gay and trans
panic claims. 166
165F

16F

For instance, in People v. Stoltz, a 1961 California appellate
case, the victim had picked up the defendant and another man who
were hitchhiking together. 167 According to the defendant, the three
men then stopped at a point along the river to drink whisky, when
the victim allegedly made a sexual advance on both men. 168 After
allegedly rejecting the victim’s advances, the defendant then
picked up a piece of wood and repeatedly hit him in the head. 169
The defendant admitted that he knew the wood “was big enough to
break [the victim’s] head open.” 170 The other man then struck the
victim twice more on the head and took the victim’s wallet and
keys. The victim suffered a fractured skull from the blows and died
soon after. 171
167F

168F

169F

170F

17F

The defendant claimed that he struck the victim because he was
frightened by the victim’s sexual advances. 172 The defense called a
psychiatrist and neurologist as an expert witness, who testified
that it was in his professional opinion that the defendant’s violent
conduct was “performed while in a state of panic or extreme
fear.” 173 Illustrating the overlap between stigmatizing attitudes towards LGBTQ people in the medical and legal domains, the wit172F

173F

165. See supra Section II.B.
166. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254‒55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); People
v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Commonwealth v. Doucette, 462 N.E.2d
1084, 1097 (Mass. 1984); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 1978); State
v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Fitzgerald v. State, 601 P.2d 1015, 1021
(Wyo. 1979).
167. 16 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
168. Id. at 287.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The appellate court decision does not explicitly mention whether the defendant
argued self-defense or insanity at trial.
173. Id.

WOODS 543 AC (DO NOT DELETE)

860

2/17/2020 1:55 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:833

ness specifically testified that “panic reaction to a homosexual situation is recognized in the field of psychiatry.” 174 The prosecution
called another psychiatrist in rebuttal who refuted the defense expert witness’s testimony. 175 Ultimately, the jury sided with the
prosecution and convicted the defendant of murder, robbery, and
grand theft. 176
174 F

175F

176F

People v. Rodriguez, the 1967 case in which gay and trans panic
concepts are first explicitly mentioned in a published court decision, also illustrates defendants’ increasing reliance on stigmatizing medical norms to support gay and trans panic defenses. 177 In
Rodriguez, the defendant relied on the concept of “acute homosexual panic” to raise the insanity defense. 178 The defendant, who was
seventeen years old at the time of the crime, killed an elderly man
by bludgeoning him in the head with a club, causing the victim to
fall and hit his head. 179 The defendant testified he was urinating
in an alley when the elderly victim grabbed him from behind. 180
The defendant claimed that he became frightened, picked up a
nearby stick, and hit the man, thinking that he was “trying to engage in a homosexual act.” 181
17F

178F

179F

180F

18F

Although the jury in Rodriguez rejected the insanity defense and
convicted the defendant of murder, 182 the case illustrates the introduction of medical terminology (“acute homosexual panic”) to reframe “homosexual assaults” in terms of the defendant’s mental
condition. 183 With the legitimacy of medical expertise, defendants
could root their defense strategies in terms of insanity law. Lending support to this idea, Rodriguez embodies a turn to rely on medical professionals as expert witnesses to determine whether a defendant who killed an LGBTQ victim acted as a result of “acute
182F

183F

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); see also Lee, supra note 1, at 491 & n.81;
Perkiss, supra note 28, at 796.
178. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
179. Id. at 254–55.
180. Id. at 255.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 254.
183. Id. at 255.
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homosexual panic.” 184 In Rodriguez, both the defense and prosecution called doctors to testify as expert witnesses who presented conflicting opinions about whether the defendant acted as a result of
“acute homosexual panic.” 185
184F

185F

Later decisions reveal how medical experts at trial specifically
defined “homosexual panic” in terms of a perpetrator’s loss of selfcontrol. Although these cases involved insanity defenses, the emphasis on the defendant’s loss of self-control is consistent with how
the gay and trans panic defenses are typically understood when
used to support provocation defenses today. 186 For instance, in People v. Parisie, an Illinois appellate case from 1972, the defendant
raised the insanity defense based on “homosexual panic.” 187 The
jury rejected the defense and found the defendant guilty of murder. 188 At trial, both the prosecution and the defense called doctors
to testify as expert witnesses. 189 The experts for each side gave conflicting professional opinions on whether the defendant acted under “homosexual panic.” 190
186F

187F

18F

189F

190F

Consistent with the Model Penal Code, Illinois law at the time
recognized the insanity defense on two grounds. 191 First, if due to
19F

184. Id. To be clear, this Article does not argue that reliance on medical experts in criminal cases involving LGBTQ defendants or victims was a new phenomenon. Medical professionals commonly testified as expert witnesses in cases involving the enforcement of “sexual
psychopath” laws between the 1940s–1960s. See DE RIVER, supra note 87, at 245–54.
185. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
186. Chen, supra note 73, at 203 (noting that under the current provocation rubric, “the
homosexual advance itself provokes the understandable loss of normal self-control that incites uncontrollable homicidal rage in any reasonable person, regardless of homosexual
tendencies”).
187. 287 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). In Parisie, the defendant shot another man
and left him on an isolated country road. Id. The victim died after being taken to the hospital. Id. The defendant testified that before the incident, the victim offered him a lift. Id. The
victim then drove to a remote area out of town and parked on a gravel road. Id. According
to the defendant, the victim then made a sexual advance, smiled, and said that “if the defendant refused he would have to walk.” Id. at 313–14. The defendant testified that he “blew
up, went crazy” and vaguely remembered struggling with the defendant and hearing gunshots. Id. at 314. The next thing that he remembered was being in the victim’s car in a
parking lot. Id. When the police found the defendant in the parking lot, he also had the
victim’s “driver’s license and credit cards in his own wallet,” and the victim’s cigarette
lighter, and wallet. Id. at 313.
188. Id. at 315.
189. Id. at 314–15.
190. Id.
191. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (outlining the elements of “mental disease or defect
excluding responsibility” under the Model Penal Code).
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a mental disease or mental defect, the defendant “lack[ed] substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.” 192
Second, if due to mental disease or defect, the defendant “lack[ed]
substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.” 193
192F

193F

One of the psychiatrists called by the defense offered general testimony on “homosexual panic” as a psychological concept. 194 In response to a hypothetical question based on the same facts as the
defendant’s personal background and the incident in question, the
psychiatrist testified that it was possible that the “hypothetical individual suffered” from “acute ‘homosexual panic.’” 195 The psychiatrist further testified that this “hypothetical individual” was “unable to conform, and unable to control the given impulse” to cause
harm because of his “homosexual panic” at the time of the incident, 196 consistent with the second legal grounds for insanity mentioned above.
194F

195F

196F

In more recent decades, claims of gay and trans panic to support
insanity or diminished capacity defenses have become less common. Rather, defendants have found greater success in using gay
and trans panic ideas to support provocation defenses. 197 Scholars
posit that one likely reason for this change is the decline of the
prevailing psychiatric view that homosexuality was a mental illness in the 1970s, 198 reflected by the deletion of homosexuality
from the DSM in 1973. 199 Scholars have also surmised that jurors
could be more sympathetic to the idea that a straight man would
be provoked to react violently to an unwanted sexual advance by a
gay man, and less sympathetic to the view that those defendants
are legally insane. 200
197F

198F

19F

20F

192. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d at 313–14 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (1967)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 314.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Chen, supra note 73, at 202 (noting that insanity and diminished capacity formulations of gay and trans panic strategies became problematic after homosexuality was deleted
from the DSM in 1973); Lee, supra note 1, at 478, 498 (“Gay panic arguments linked to
claims of mental defect have largely been unsuccessful, whereas gay panic arguments linked
to claims of provocation have been relatively successful.”).
198. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 498.
199. See BAYER, supra note 78, at 40.
200. Lee, supra note 1, at 505. As discussed in the next Part, empirical research supports
this idea. See Salerno et al., supra note 34, at 24.
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Even after this shift away from insanity to provocation, published appellate court opinions show that defendants still rely on
medical experts to support their claims of gay and trans panic.
Consider the following three examples. In State v. Ritchey, the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1973 rejected a defendant’s challenge
that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying a motion
requesting that the court appoint a psychiatrist to evaluate him for
the purposes of preparing a provocation defense based on claims of
gay and trans panic. 201 In 1989, a California appellate court rejected a defendant’s challenge that the trial court had abused its
discretion in denying expert testimony from a psychiatrist and psychologist claiming that because of the defendant’s “particular background he was capable of reacting with abnormal rage and disgust
to a homosexual advance.” 202 In State v. Bodoh, a Wisconsin appellate court in 2001 rejected a defendant’s challenge that his counsel
was ineffective for not requesting a psychological evaluation that,
in the defendant’s view, would have supported his claim of gay
panic to support his provocation defense. 203
201F

20F

203F

In sum, even if it is proper to initially characterize the violence
involved in gay and trans panic cases as private acts of violence,
these acts assume a different meaning in the criminal process
when perpetrators are able to take advantage of stigmatizing medical ideas that characterize LGBTQ victims as sexual aggressors
and place the blame on them for the violence. The historical roots
of “gay and trans panic” do not lie in the substantive criminal law.
Rather, these ideas are vestiges of a broader state and social
agenda dating back to at least the early twentieth century that empowered medical experts to regulate and control “sexual deviance.” 204 The state had a direct role in supporting doctors in its own
institutions who not only embraced the pathological model of homosexuality, but also redefined gay and trans panic in ways that
placed the blame on LGBTQ people for the violence they experienced in state institutions and society more broadly. Therefore, al204F

201. 573 P.2d 973, 974–75 (Kan. 1977).
202. Ken Cody, Last Gasp for Public Defense, S.F. SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 1989, at 10, 10;
Philip Hager, Convicted Killer’s ‘Homosexual Panic’ Defense Rejected, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14,
1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-10-14-mn-261-story.html [https://
perma.cc/G5ZW-VF7R].
203. 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS 890, at *2–3 (2001) (per curiam).
204. Wodda & Panfil, supra note 28, at 941 (noting that gay and trans panic defenses
“employ[] a ‘deviance’ frame”).
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lowing gay and trans panic claims to be recognized under the substantive criminal law leaves space for outmoded ideas of sexual deviance to continue to thrive in the criminal justice system today.
The remainder of this Article turns to discuss this point.
IV. TOWARDS A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LEGISLATION
BANNING THE GAY AND TRANS PANIC DEFENSES
It is misguided to distance the history discussed above, and especially the role of the state in the growth of gay and trans panic
in medicine and law, from how the gay and trans panic defenses
are treated under the criminal law today. Based on this idea, this
Part provides an early foundation for a political framework that
justifies banning the gay and trans panic defenses through legislation. The analysis below connects the goals of this political framework to current radical and critical criminal justice perspectives
that challenge the pervasive, structural criminal justice inequalities rooted in racial, class, gender, and sexual hierarchies. The
analysis further discusses due process critiques of these legislative
bans as well as the debate over whether these bans effectively combat anti-LGBTQ juror biases.
In federal court and in most state courts today, the gay and trans
panic defenses are still available legal strategies for defendants
who assault or kill LGBTQ victims. In recent decades, some lower
courts have limited or prohibited the gay and trans panic defenses. 205 Improvements in public attitudes towards homosexuality and advancements in the legal treatment of LGBTQ people, and
lesbians and gays in particular, are likely reasons for this judicial
205F

205. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1392 (2010) (noting that the gay panic defense “is now
received skeptically by many courts”); Am. Bar Ass'n, Res. 113A, at 9 (2013), http://lgbtbar.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Gay-and-Trans-Panic-Defenses-Resolution.pdf
(“Courts
have increasingly been skeptical of gay panic arguments to support defense claims of insanity or provocation.”) [https://perma.cc/MSM7-LTBX]; see, e.g., Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089
(Fla. 2005) (per curiam) (“This Court has not previously recognized that a nonviolent homosexual advance may constitute sufficient provocation to incite an individual to lose his selfcontrol and commit acts in the heat of passion, thus reducing murder to manslaughter.”);
Ritchey, 573 P.2d 973 (affirming that the deceased victim’s same-sex sexual advances were
not legally sufficient provocation); State v. Lewis, 685 So. 2d 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting provocation defense based on the victim’s same-sex sexual advances); State v. Volk,
421 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a defendant’s disgust towards a
homosexual advance is not sufficient legal provocation); Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d
1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that “the sight of naked women engaged in lesbian
lovemaking is not adequate provocation”).
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pushback. 206 But even in states where individual trial and intermediate appellate courts have curbed them, the gay and trans
panic defenses are still widely available.
206F

The political framework that this Article envisions for legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses balances the traditional justifications for punishment with two cornerstone values:
(1) state accountability towards LGBTQ people and communities
(as well as other marginalized populations), and (2) equality under
the substantive criminal law. As discussed below, upholding these
values requires an analysis of how the state has treated LGBTQ
people in the past and what that treatment says about whether the
state is currently fulfilling what ought to be a baseline normative
commitment to respect LGBTQ civilians, and not sponsor, excuse,
justify, or condone violence against them. 207 In the context of the
gay and trans panic defenses, maintaining this normative commitment means that it is necessary to prioritize the demands of state
accountability and equality for LGBTQ people under the substantive criminal law over defendants’ due process interest in presenting every legal strategy that might benefit their case.
207F

Theoretical perspectives on criminal law tend to overlook equality as an underlying value of the substantive criminal law and
place primacy on the traditional justifications for punishment (i.e.,
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). 208 The
conception of equality that this Article envisions for this political
framework is consistent with the principle of substantive equality,
not formal equality. 209 In this regard, this Article is not arguing
that lawmaking bodies should ban the gay and trans panic defenses in order to ensure that violence against LGBTQ people is
punished in the same way as similar violence against non-LGBTQ
people. In addition, this political framework is not motivated by a
208F

209F

206. See ALAN YANG, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE FOUND., FROM WRONGS TO
RIGHTS: PUBLIC OPINION ON GAY AND LESBIAN AMERICANS MOVES TOWARD EQUALITY,
1973–1999, at 23 (1999) (“The striking trend in public opinion during the 1990’s is that all
groups became more accepting of homosexuality.”); Paul R. Brewer, The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay Rights, 65 J. POL., 1208, 1208 (2003) (emphasizing that
“public attitudes about homosexuality changed dramatically over the course of the 1990s”).
207. Thomas, supra note 13, at 1477 (recognizing “that one of the first duties of the state
is to protect citizens from whom its powers derive against random, unchecked violence by
other citizens, or by government officials”).
208. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 38, at 1452; Way, supra note 18, at 203–04.
209. Sullivan, supra note 37, at 750 (“On the formal view, inequality consists of treating
people differently across an irrelevant criterion; on the substantive view, the injury is subordinating one group to another.”).
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desire for harsher punishment of defendants who perpetrate violence against LGBTQ victims. Rather, this Article’s claim is that
the gay and trans panic defenses embody and perpetrate unjust
sexual and gender hierarchies that are rooted in outdated sexual
deviance concepts that stigmatize and subjugate LGBTQ people.
Maintaining equality for LGBTQ people under the substantive
criminal law demands that the state reject these unjust sexual and
gender hierarchies, which the state had a hand in creating, and are
infused in the gay and trans panic defenses. 210
210F

Placing primacy on the cornerstone values of state accountability and substantive equality under the criminal law helps to align
the goals of legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses
with current radical and critical criminal justice perspectives that
challenge the pervasive, structural criminal justice inequalities
rooted in racial, class, gender, and sexual hierarchies. 211 These important perspectives describe how mass incarceration has taken its
harshest toll on people and communities of color and contextualize
mass incarceration within a broader historical pattern of state subjugation of Black, poor, and other marginalized communities of
color. 212 At the same time, these perspectives explain how the criminal justice system has provided little protection or redress for
21F

21F

210. Scholars have raised similar arguments about the tensions between principles of
formal equality and racial and gender equality in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 29, at 844 (“In the criminal justice system . . . there is tension between the
ideal of formal equality and the reality of white supremacy, historic and present.”); Erin R.
Collins, The Evidentiary Rules of Engagement in the War Against Domestic Violence, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 406 (2015) (discussing how in the context of domestic violence, “[i]n
contrast to liberal feminism, which targets differential treatment as the source of women’s
inequality and demands formal equality from the state, dominance feminism identifies
women's powerlessness relative to men as the cause of their subordination and supports
state interventions that correct this power imbalance”).
211. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 29; Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of
Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018); Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging
Gender Violence in a Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13 (2011); Allegra M. McLeod,
Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015); Roberts, supra note
29; Manifesto for Abolition, ABOLITION, https://abolitionjournal.org/frontpage [https://per
ma.cc/RZF4-YL9P].
212. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 29, at 15 (“While a relatively small proportion of the
population has ever directly experienced life inside prison, this is not true in poor black and
Latino communities. Neither is it true for Native Americans or for certain Asian-American
communities.”); Akbar, supra note 211, at 412 (“Contemporary racial justice movements are
not simply arguing the state has created a fundamentally unequal criminal legal system.
They are identifying policing, jail, and prison as the primary mode of governing black, poor,
and other communities of color in the United States, and pointing to law as the scaffolding.”); McLeod, supra note 211, at 1185 (“Alongside imprisonment’s general structural brutality, abolition merits further consideration as an ethical framework because of the racial
subordination inherent in both historical and contemporary practices of incarceration and
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crime victims from the most intersectionally marginalized communities. 213 They further critique the effectiveness of incarceration
and advocate for restorative and transformative solutions that better address the needs of victims, offenders, communities, and
broader society. 214
213F

214F

Consistent with these ideas, the law and legal systems often fail
to protect LGBTQ victims who are most vulnerable to being
blamed for the violence they experience through the gay and trans
panic defenses—namely, those who are transgender, people of
color, poor, or marginalized in other ways. 215 For instance, in 2019
alone, advocates tracked twenty-six known killings of transgender
and gender nonconforming people in the United States who were
fatally shot or killed by other violent means. 216 Almost all of the
victims were transgender women of color, and black transgender
women in particular. 217
215F

216F

217F

The types of unjust hierarchies that current radical and critical
criminal law perspectives seek to eliminate are infused in the gay
and trans panic defenses. In prioritizing equality as a value of substantive criminal law, legislation banning the gay and trans panic
defenses rejects the idea that convictions should be avoided and
punitive policing.”).
213. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 751 (2007)
(“The domestic violence system treats victims with increasing amounts of paternalism and
disdain.”); Harris, supra note 211, at 17 (“[S]cholars and activists committed to ending domestic violence and violence against sexual minorities have become increasingly disenchanted with the criminal justice system, and increasingly aware of its insidious role in the
decimation of poor black and brown communities.”).
214. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 29, at 20–21 (“Effective alternatives involve both transformation of the techniques for addressing ‘crime’ and of the social and economic conditions
that track so many children from poor communities, and especially communities of color,
into the juvenile system and then on to prison.”); Roberts, supra note 29, at 46 (“Rejecting
the carceral paradigm, black feminist abolitionists have proposed community-based transformative justice responses that address the social causes of violence and hold people accountable without exposing them to police violence and state incarceration.”).
215. See sources cited supra note 31 and accompanying text.
216. Violence Against the Transgender Community in 2019, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/violence-against-the-transgender-community-in-2019 [https:
//perma.cc/8A9C-ML3A]. It is important to underscore that existing data sources distort our
understanding of homicide trends involving transgender and gender nonconforming people
in the United States because of the lack of formal data collection efforts. See Rebecca L.
Stotzer, Data Sources Hinder Our Understanding of Transgender Murders, 107 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1362, 1362 (2017).
217. Elliot Kozuch, HRC Mourns Yahira Nesby, Black Trans Woman Killed in Brooklyn,
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-mourns-yahiranesby-black-trans-woman-kill(ed-in-brooklyn) (“[Yahira] Nesby’s death is at least the 25th
known transgender or gender non-conforming person killed this year.”) [https://perma.
cc/3J8A-XDNZ]; Violence Against the Transgender Community in 2019, supra note 216.
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punishment should be reduced based on antiquated sexual deviance concepts that stigmatize LGBTQ victims. It is possible to reject these unjust hierarchies through legislation banning the gay
and trans panic defenses while pursuing restorative and transformative strategies to respond to violence committed against
LGBTQ victims. Illustrating these points, the National Coalition
of Anti-Violence Programs advocates for restorative justice models
as an alternative response to incarceration for anti-LGBTQ hate
violence, 218 but also recommends prohibiting the gay and trans
panic defenses on the grounds that they “shift the blame for . . .
inexcusable attacks back to the victim.” 219
218F

219F

This political framework that stresses state accountability and
substantive equality under the criminal law also demonstrates
why due process concerns do not fully capture what is at stake in
gay and trans panic cases. The individualized focus of existing due
process critiques treats gay and trans panic cases as incidents that
involve private violence perpetrated by one civilian against another, and in so doing, neglects the historical role of the state in
the origins and growth of gay and trans panic in medicine and
law. 220 Moreover, these due process critiques overlook the unjust
structural hierarchies that the gay and trans panic defenses embody and perpetuate in criminal justice contexts. 221
20F

21F

In spite of their limited scope, due process arguments are important to take seriously. With regard to constitutional due process
protections, the United States Supreme Court is currently considering in Kahler v. Kansas whether the Eighth and Fourteenth

218. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2009,
at 44 (2010), https://avp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2011_NCAVP_HV_Reports.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A54T-94LN].
219. Id. at 45.
220. Scholars advocating for a greater focus on equality in substantive criminal law have
raised a similar critique about the individualized nature of the focus of criminal law more
generally. See, e.g., Way, supra note 18, at 239 (“The criminal law functions by narrowing
its focus on particular acts, particular actors and particular moments in time.”).
221. Canadian legal scholars have raised similar concerns about the tensions between
due process and racial inequality in the Canadian criminal justice system. As Kent Roach
has argued, “[n]ot all systems of systemic racism . . . invite more due process.” Kent Roach,
Systemic Racism and Criminal Justice Policy, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 236, 237
(1996). In raising this point, Roach stressed that “[a]boriginal women do not receive the
equal protection of the law when they are victims of crime.” Id. He further stressed the
“[p]olice shootings of black men in Toronto and the failure of the criminal justice system to
convict the shooters.” Id.
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Amendments permit states to abolish the insanity defense. 222 The
Court’s decision could affirm the broad authority of states to define
the elements of crimes and defenses in their respective penal
codes. 223 This reasoning would lend support to the idea that states
could constitutionally prohibit the gay and trans panic defenses
through legislation.
2F

23F

Alternatively, the Court in Kahler could constitutionally require
states to recognize freestanding criminal defenses with deep historical roots in the substantive criminal law (for instance, provocation, insanity, and self-defense). 224 If the Court goes in this direction, the constitutional arguments for banning the gay and trans
panic defenses through legislation could become more complicated.
At the same time, legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses is different from the insanity defense bans in Kahler in two
significant ways.
24F

First, legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses does
not eliminate any freestanding criminal defense. As explained previously, the gay and trans panic defenses are not freestanding defenses. 225 Rather, these legislative bans narrowly restrict the circumstances under which certain defendants are entitled, as a
matter of law, to raise those freestanding defenses. Defining the
circumstances under which defendants can raise established free25F

222. 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom., Kahler v. Kansas,
139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
223. See State v. Casey, 71 P.3d 351, 355 (Ariz. 2003) (recognizing the “legislature’s constitutional authority to define crimes and defenses”); Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State,
368 P.3d 1131, 1157 (Mont. 2016) (“The State, pursuant to its police powers, may define . . .
what constitutes a defense . . . to a state prosecution.”); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable
Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 502 (1989) (“The legislature’s most direct way to control abuse of defenses derives from its power to define the substantive criminal law.”). For a more thorough critique of the due process arguments against
banning the gay and trans panic defenses, see WOODS, SEARS & MALLORY, supra note 3, at
16–20, and Cynthia Lee, The Trans Panic Defense Revisited, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author).
224. 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 11, at 63 n.1 (1984) (“Most of the
defenses recognized today, and in some cases their precise formulation, have not changed
in more than 300 years.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105
VA. L. REV. 965, 967 (2019) (stressing that “the creation of self-defense and other affirmative
defenses . . . all derive from the common law”). The first reported use of gay and trans panic
by a criminal defendant, however, only dates back to 1967. Lee, supra note 1, at 491 & n.81.
225. See supra Part III.
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standing defenses is something that lawmaking bodies have customarily done and continue to do when shaping their own penal
codes. 226
26F

Second, legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses
does not eliminate criminal defenses with deep historical roots in
the common law (for instance, provocation, insanity, or self-defense). Dating back to only the mid-twentieth century, 227 the gay
and trans panic defenses are relatively recent in origin compared
to the much longer history of the substantive criminal law. Constitutionally, the extent to which a criminal defense is deeply rooted
in history and tradition is a key factor under one of the United
States Supreme Court’s methods for evaluating whether a criminal
defense is “a fundamental principal of justice” under the Due Process Clause. 228
27F

28F

Even if not constitutionally protected or required, legislation
banning the gay and trans panic defenses still implicates important due process interests of criminal defendants. Specifically,
these legislative bans prompt questions about whether, as a policy
matter, the substantive criminal law should be structured in a way
that allows defendants to present every legal strategy that could
potentially strengthen their case. There are also important fairness considerations in allowing the state to benefit from legislation
banning the gay and trans panic defenses when the state contributed to the growth of these defenses in the past. One might argue
that it is unfair to encourage legislation that benefits the state in
this fashion at the expense of disadvantaging future criminal defendants, who unlike the state, had no direct role in the growth of
gay and trans panic as a concept.
Framing the stakes of legislation banning the gay and trans
panic defenses in political terms helps to answer these questions
by shifting the focus of the debate to core political questions about
the relationship between the state and LGBTQ civilians. Specifically, this framing places primacy on whether the state is fulfilling
what ought to be a baseline normative commitment to respect
LGBTQ civilians, and more specifically, not sponsor, excuse, justify, or condone violence against them. 229 How LGBTQ people are
29F

226. See sources cited supra note 223.
227. See supra Section II.B.
228. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42–44 (1996) (plurality opinion).
229. Thomas, supra note 13, at 1477.
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recognized and treated as victims under the substantive criminal
law exemplifies the relationship between the state and LGBTQ civilians. Therefore, even if the state benefits from legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses when it was a “bad” actor in
the past, those benefits are ultimately politically desirable. These
legislative bans reconfigure the relationship between the state and
LGBTQ people under the substantive criminal law in ways that
further LGBTQ inclusion and equality.
Of course, the state is not the only actor responsible for the
growth of gay and trans panic ideas in the medical and criminal
justice domains. The historical analysis presented in this Article,
however, shows that the state is a central player in this story and
illustrates a need to hold the state accountable for its role in enabling gay and trans panic concepts to thrive. Legislation banning
the gay and trans panic defenses holds the state accountable for
how doctors and staff in public institutions treated members of the
public, and LGBTQ patients in particular. In line with this notion
of accountability, the United States Supreme Court and several
lower courts have held that public hospitals, including public hospital doctors and staff, are state actors subject to constitutional requirements. 230
230F

Finally, the focus on state accountability and substantive equality under the criminal law informs the scholarly debate over
whether formal bans against the gay and trans panic defenses can
effectively combat anti-LGBTQ juror biases. Although research is
sparse, the leading empirical study on the gay and trans panic defenses lends support to the notion that jurors could be more sympathetic to the idea that a straight man would react violently to an
unwanted sexual advance by a gay man. 231 The study specifically
231F

230. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001) (holding that state
hospital employees are state actors subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions); Chudacoff
v. Univ. Med. Cntr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (stressing that “there is no dispute
that the operation of [a public] hospital is state action” (quoting Woodbury v. McKinnon,
447 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1971))); Jones v. Nickens, 961 F. Supp. 2d 475, 486 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (finding employees of a public hospital to be “state actors for the purposes of Section
1983”); Lewellen v. Schneck Med. Ctr., No. 4:05-cv-00083-JDT-WGH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60358, at *19 n.10 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (“A county-owned public hospital, like a public school or
a municipal park, is a state actor.”); Brandt v. Saint Vincent Infirmary, 701 S.W.2d 103
(Ark. 1985) (“Public hospitals are prohibited from acting arbitrarily and capriciously under
the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.”); Feyz v. Mercy Mem’l Hosp., 719 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Mich. 2006) (stressing
that “public hospitals are state actors implicating adherence to constitutional requirements”).
231. See Salerno et al., supra note 34, at 24, 32. The study involved a multiethnic sample
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examined the connection between gay and trans panic provocation
defenses and jurors’ political orientation. 232 It found that conservative participants were significantly less punitive when the defendant claimed to have acted out of gay and trans panic compared to
the non-gay-and-trans-panic scenario. 233 Facts involving gay and
trans panic, however, did not sway liberal jurors. 234 The researchers explained these differences in terms of the participants’ moral
outrage. 235 They hypothesized that conservative jurors were less
morally outraged towards a defendant who killed in response to a
same-sex sexual advance than in response to reasons that did not
involve gay and trans panic. 236 Conversely, in their view, the samesex sexual advance did not reduce liberal jurors’ moral outrage towards that defendant. 237
23F

23F

234F

235F

236F

237F

Scholars and advocates have argued that gay and trans panic
defenses invite jurors to draw upon their own anti-LGBTQ biases
when evaluating evidence and making decisions. 238 Simply put, jurors’ own anti-LGBTQ biases could lead them to conclude that violence is a reasonable reaction to LGBTQ victims, and especially
LGBTQ victims who allegedly make sexual advances towards the
defendants. 239 Other scholars and commentators who are sympathetic to LGBTQ victims, however, have argued that formal legislative and judicial bans on the gay and trans panic defenses could
make it more difficult to combat explicit and implicit anti-LGBTQ
238F

239F

of seventy-four men and women who were eligible for jury service. Id. at 27. The researchers
randomly assigned participants to evaluate either a gay panic scenario that involved a victim’s same-sex sexual advance or a provocation scenario that did not have gay panic-related
facts. Id. at 27–28.
232. Id. at 24.
233. Id. at 32.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 27.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 205, at 7 (stressing that the gay and trans panic
defenses “seek to exploit jurors’ bias and prejudice”).
239. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“The defense implicitly urges the jury to conclude that bias against
gay or transgender individuals is reasonable, and that a violent reaction is therefore an
understandable outcome of that bias.”); Mison, supra note 28, at 158 (stressing that “the
defendant hopes that the typical American juror—a product of homophobic and heterocentric American society—will evaluate the homosexual victim and homosexual overture with
feelings of fear, revulsion, and hatred”); Strader et al., supra note 28, at 1517 (“[T]he most
fundamental form of anti-gay bias that the gay panic defense elicits for the jury is the idea
that the gay victim is to blame.”).
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juror bias. 240 From this perspective, the more effective way to combat anti-LGBTQ bias in gay and trans panic cases would be for
prosecutors to force anti-LGBTQ biases to come out into the open
in court and then aggressively reject those biases during both jury
selection and in front of the judge and jury at trial. 241
240F

241F

This debate over whether banning the gay and trans panic defenses can effectively combat anti-LGBTQ juror biases on the
ground raises several issues that require future empirical study.
For instance, it is uncertain whether these bans are more or less
effective in combating anti-LGBTQ juror biases among certain jurors (for instance, from particular demographic or geographic backgrounds). It is also unclear whether allowing prosecutors to combat
anti-LGBTQ juror biases in open court actually prevents jurors
from relying on their own implicit or explicit anti-LGBTQ biases
when evaluating evidence and making decisions in gay and trans
panic cases. These issues prompt further questions about the importance of expanding protections to prohibit sexual orientation
and gender identity discrimination during jury selection 242 as well
24F

240. Lee, supra note 1, at 475 (“When gay panic arguments are forced to take a covert
turn—when they are not explicit or out in the open—they may actually be more effective
than they would be if out in the open.”); Lee & Kwan, supra note 28, at 122 (“[A] legislative
ban is a big hammer when a gentle nudge might be a more effective way to get jurors to do
the right thing.”). It is important to acknowledge that in more recent work, Cynthia Lee has
argued in favor of formal prohibitions on the gay and trans panic defenses. See generally,
Lee, supra note 223. These important critical arguments about the effectiveness of these
formal prohibitions in combating anti-LGBTQ juror biases in gay and trans panic cases are
included in Lee’s earlier scholarship on the gay and trans panic defenses.
241. Lee, supra note 1, at 559 (“To limit the effectiveness of gay panic defense strategies,
I offer two suggestions to prosecutors: (1) during voir dire, request questions designed to
identify closet homophobes, and (2) make the possibility of sexual orientation bias salient
throughout the trial.”); Lee & Kwan, supra note 28, at 122 (discussing specific tactics for
prosecutors to humanize transgender victims when the trans panic defense is raised in particular cases).
242. Peremptory strikes of jurors based on sexual orientation and gender identity are
legal in most states. Julia C. Maddera, Note, Batson in Transition: Prohibiting Peremptory
Challenges on the Basis of Gender Identity or Expression, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 195, 203, 206
(2016). In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that discrimination
on the basis of race in jury selection is unconstitutional and violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986). The Ninth Circuit has extended Batson protections to peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471, 484–86 (9th Cir. 2014). See generally Giovanna Shay, In the
Box: Voir Dire on LGBT Issues in Changing Times, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 407 (2014)
(discussing anti-LGBT bias in voir dire); Kathryne M. Young, Outing Batson: How the Case
of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 243
(2011) (discussing anti-LGBT bias in voir dire).
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as designing best practices for questioning prospective jurors during voir dire to identify and strike jurors who may hold antiLGBTQ biases. 243
243F

In spite of these uncertainties, the more important point is that
issues of anti-LGBTQ juror bias in gay and trans panic cases involve problems in how the criminal law is applied as opposed to
inequalities in the substantive criminal law itself. 244 Focusing on
the political dimensions of legislation banning the gay and trans
panic defenses broadens the inquiry to consider those equality issues and their relationship to state accountability. As discussed
above, the historical roots of gay and trans panic do not lie in the
substantive criminal law. Rather, these concepts are vestiges of a
broader state and social agenda dating back to the late-nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries that embraced medicine to regulate
and control “sexual deviance” in ways that demeaned and stigmatized LGBTQ people. 245 Legislation banning the gay and trans
panic defenses takes this history into account by rejecting antiquated notions of sexual deviance and their ability to shape when
freestanding defenses are legally recognized under the substantive
criminal law.
24F

245F

CONCLUSION
There are various ways that states could go about enacting legislation banning gay and trans panic defense strategies. 246 In 2016,
the Williams Institute released the following comprehensive model
legislation that rejects gay and trans panic strategies to support
the freestanding defenses of provocation, insanity (or diminished
capacity), and self-defense (or imperfect self-defense):
246F

Section 101. Restrictions on the Defense of Provocation. For purposes
of determining sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation was
not objectively reasonable if it resulted from the discovery of,

243. Woods, supra note 33, at 69–70 (describing different questioning methods proposed
by scholars and advocates to identify prospective jurors who hold anti-LGBTQ biases during
voir dire).
244. Cf. Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043,
1059 (2005) (noting in the context of juror biases on the basis of gender that “[i]t is not
merely jurors applying the law who might favor male values; it is the law itself”).
245. Wodda & Panfil, supra note 28, at 941 (noting that gay and trans panic defenses
“employ[] a ‘deviance’ frame”).
246. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 205; WOODS, SEARS & MALLORY, supra note 3,
at 22; Strader et al., supra note 28, at 1524–25.
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knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the
defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or
sexual relationship.
Section 102. Restrictions on the Defense of Diminished Capacity. A defendant does not suffer from reduced mental capacity based on the
discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s
actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim
made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards
the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic
or sexual relationship. 247
Section 103. Restrictions on the Defense of Self-Defense. A person is not
justified in using force against another based on the discovery of,
knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the
defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or
sexual relationship. 248
247F

248F

Notably, language similar to this model legislation appears in recent legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses in California, 249 Hawaii, 250 Illinois, 251 Maine, 252 Nevada, 253 New Jersey, 254
New York, 255 and Rhode Island. 256
249F

250F

25F

251F

25F

253F

254F

256F

Putting aside the issue of specific statutory language, on a more
fundamental level, this Article illustrated the importance of ana-

247. This language could be used to restrict either insanity or diminished capacity defenses.
248. WOODS, SEARS & MALLORY, supra note 3, at 22.
249. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(f)(1).
250. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702(2).
251. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(c) (first degree murder); id. at 5/9-2(b) (second degree
murder).
252. ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 38 (mental abnormality); id. § 108-3 (physical force in defense
of a person); id. § 201-4 (murder).
253. S.B. 97 § 1-2, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §
193, __).
254. A1796, 218th Leg., 2d. Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2020) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-4, __).
255. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a)(ii) (murder in the second degree); id. §
125.26(3)(a)(ii) (aggravated murder); id. § 125.27(2)(a)(i) (murder in the first degree).
256. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-17 (restrictions on the defense of provocation); id. § 1217-18 (restrictions on the defense of diminished capacity); id. § 12-17-19 (restrictions on the
defense of self-defense).
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lyzing and providing a theoretical account of the political dimensions of legislation banning the gay and trans panic defenses. The
analysis of this Article brought to the surface how the state was a
key player in the origin and growth of gay and trans panic as a
medical concept and criminal defense. In light of this history and
continued violence against LGBTQ people, a political framework
that emphasizes values of state accountability and equality under
the substantive criminal law illustrates why legislation banning
the gay and trans panic defenses is both justified and necessary.

